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1. Introduction 
Civil disobedience has always existed, but as a philosophical notion it only 
arrived relatively late in the history of political theory. This is no coinci-
dence. It was only when a public sphere accessible to all had developed in 
modern times that new opportunities for effective civil disobedience came 
into being. The reason for this is not self-evident. The public sphere is in 
some ways distorted, making it problematic for the civilly disobedient to 
make a public appeal for social justice. To them the public sphere is there-
fore both a curse and a blessing. Civil disobedience may nevertheless be 
effective. As a moral issue it is usually discussed in terms of reasons and 
acts. In this article I will focus on its effectiveness and argue, from a moral 
perspective, how civil disobedience can be effective despite the distortions 
the public sphere suffers from. 
Civil disobedience has its place within a broad spectrum of actions that 
make up political (and civil) resistance. They range from self-initiated civil 
participation, such as the Belgian G1000 (www.g1000.org), via legal dem-
onstration and illegal protests, as we have seen during the Arab Spring, to 
violent actions. We may differentiate between these different forms of po-
litical resistance by taking heed of what makes them effective. Political 
resistance may be effective primarily on the basis of either employing dia-
logical resources or real confrontation. The importance of this distinction 
is that the first type still functions within the existing power of structure 
of society, drawing on resources of symbolic power to persuade the people 
in power who owe their dominance to greater resources, including a mo-
nopoly on violence, while the effectiveness of the second type depends, on 
the basis of real confrontations, on achieving a direct change in society’s 
balance of power. What makes the category of civil disobedience a special 
one, is that it may be the only form of resistance that can be effective in 
both respects (although not necessarily simultaneously). If people obeying 
the law is a necessary condition for the ruling social groups to stay in po-
wer, then breaking this law (for example when soldiers refuse to obey an 
order to shoot at demonstrators) will have an immediate effect as a real 
confrontation (see Corlett 1997 who discusses the possibility of non-
violent, coercive civil disobedience). But breaking the law may also have 
an effect when it affects not primarily power resources, but people’s 
minds. Here I will focus on the effectiveness of civil disobedience from the 
perspective of civil disobedience as a moral, more specifically as a dialogical 
practice (cf. Smith 2011: civil disobedience as ‘deliberative practice’). 
Political theorists usually agree on a standard notion of civil disobedience 
that comprises at least three characteristics that can be found in the Rawl-
sian notion of civil disobedience: it involves breaking the law, is non-
violent and is public. As Rawls’s notion of civil disobedience still domi-
nates literature on this subject, I will take this as a starting-point for criti-
cising the standard notion of Rawls (Rawls 1991a; 1999b). Rawls too starts 
from the idea that civil disobedience is a form of political resistance. What 
sets civil disobedience apart from these other forms is that it entails ac-
tions that are both illegal and non-violent. Other features Rawls attributes 
to civil disobedience are not specific to it, but are inherent to all forms of 
resistance, i.e. that they are ‘guided and justified by political principles’. 
Civil disobedience has one other feature it shares with other forms of po-
litical resistance: it is public. 
 
I will argue that Rawls cannot explain how civil disobedience may be ef-
fective as a public appeal for social justice, because he does not fully un-
derstand what it means for civil disobedience to be public in relation to 
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the public sphere. His analysis would require an additional notion of pub-
licity which, as I will argue, is the notion of hermeneutical publicity. From 
a Bourdieusian perspective I then make a case for the claim that public 
spheres always suffer from hermeneutic invisibility. This may explain why 
non-violent appeals for social justice fail as dialogical practices. Finally I 
will suggest how we nevertheless could understand that civil disobedience 
can be effective as a dialogical practice. 
 
2. Hermeneutical invisibility 
According to Rawls civil disobedience is a public act in two different ways: 
by addressing public principles and by entering the public forum. When 
breaking the law, which is not necessarily the same law that is being pro-
tested against, the civilly disobedient justify their act with an address to 
public principles. With their appeal they intend to denounce what they 
consider to be unjust laws. Their criticism is ‘guided and justified by po-
litical principles’. Next, the civilly disobedient make their appeal in public, 
i.e. address a public with their act of breaking the law. An act of civil diso-
bedience is by itself not enough, it should be backed up by efforts to offer 
an explanation for breaking the law. Civil disobedience – as both the act of 
breaking the law itself and the accompanying acts that disclose its appeals 
– is then ‘engaged in openly with fair notice; it is not covert or secretive. 
One may compare it to public speech, and being a form of address, an ex-
pression of profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place 
in the public forum' (Rawls 1999b: 321). The notion of publicity, in both its 
senses, demonstrates two different dimensions of the public sphere, a sub-
ject that Rawls explores more extensively in his Political Liberalism. Rawls 
has been criticised by deliberative and discourse theorists for offering a 
notion of the public sphere that is restricted to public opinion in the gov-
ernmental and legal domain and excludes public opinion in the domain 
of civil society (cf. Benhabib 1996; Charney 1998). But this debate does not 
affect the criticism of his notion of publicity being discussed in this article. 
 
If the only requirements for civil disobedience to be a public act were ‘ad-
dressing public principles’ and ‘entering the public forum’, then taking 
recourse to illegal acts of protest would not be necessary: legal acts of pro-
test already meet these requirements. Rawls acknowledges that people 
who make normal appeals against injustice, by performing legal acts of 
protest, may experience difficulties that make it hard for their protest to 
be heard. As examples he mentions the indifference and the unwillingness 
of the dominant majority. He then concludes that, when ‘normal appeals 
to the political majority [...] have failed’, civil disobedience is ‘a last resort’ 
(Rawls 1999b: 327): ‘[b]y engaging in civil disobedience a minority forces 
the majority to consider whether it wishes to have its actions construed in 
this way, or whether, in view of the common sense of injustice, it wishes 
to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the minority’ (ibid.: 321). Rawls 
does not choose to theorise such difficulties as indifference or unwilling-
ness as a problem of publicity. This weakens, in the first place, his notion 
of the public forum. Rawls concedes that making one’s appeal in public is 
obviously not enough when the public it addresses is indifferent or un-
willing to listen. But it then remains unclear why a public sphere that 
does not function properly for normal appeals would do so for civil diso-
bedience. As breaking the law is the one difference that he discusses in 
comparing normal appeals with those of civil disobedience, Rawls seems 
to assume that the symbolic force of an illegal (non-violent) act is already 
enough to arouse the attention of the dominant majority. But even this 
explanation would be unsatisfactory. Underlying his analysis of moral ap-
peals for justice is the assumption that they, whether they are sustained 
by legal or illegal acts, essentially aim to persuade the dominant public. 
But it is not obvious that breaking the law has this effect. It may even 
strengthen the opinion of the dominant public that this minority deserves 
no just treatment. Rawls’ notion of the ‘public forum’ is too weak to 
overcome the issues I raise here. This is due to the restrictive definition of 
his other notion of publicity: the appeal to public principles. To show this 
I will first discuss the Rosa Parks case. 
The case of Rosa Parks is commonly regarded as a typical case of civil diso-
bedience. In Montgomery a city ordinance prescribed that seats in buses 
should be segregated: the first four rows of seats were reserved for white 
passengers while black passengers could be seated in the remaining rows. 
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One day in December 1955, Rosa Parks, a black woman, refused to give up 
her seat for a white passenger. She was arrested for this. It ignited one of 
the great events of the Civil Rights Movement: the 1955-6 the Montgo-
mery Bus Boycott (McAdam 2011). If we first look at this case from the 
perspective of the public sphere, the essence of the dominant public opin-
ion was the ‘separate and equal’ doctrine, which stated that the separation 
of black and white people was compatible with the idea of their equality. 
The basic, legal source for this doctrine was a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America in the case Plessy v. Ferguson (163 
U.S. 537 (1896)). This decision was repudiated only in 1954 by a new deci-
sion in the case Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954)). If, how-
ever, we look beyond the dominant public opinion and what laws were 
saying, African-Americans suffered in many ways from a severely discri-
minatory attitude towards them. It lead to brutal practices of lynching 
men and raping women, but it also translated into many more subtle 
practices of discrimination (McGuire 2010). Gradually some African-
Americans organised themselves for political action. When the Rosa Parks 
incident took place in 1955, they had already been looking for an interest-
ing case that could lend itself not just to an appeal to the dominant pub-
lic, as it appears, but also to a mobilisation of their community to mass 
protest actions. The case of Rosa Parks was carefully and strategically cho-
sen. An important consideration was the estimation of how the press and 
the public opinion would judge her integrity and respectability. For this 
reason the earlier, similar, case of Claudette Colvin was rejected (McGuire 
2010). 
 
The notion of the ‘public forum’ is defective due to the restrictive defini-
tion of Rawls’ other notion of publicity: the appeal to public principles. As 
Rawls sees it, the civilly disobedient appeal to public principles with the 
aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government. 
But this prevents him from seeing other, deeper-lying forms of injustice. 
For example, seeing the Civil Rights Movement, of which Parks became 
part, as a struggle primarily against unjust laws fails to recognise that this 
movement was a response, as the Rosa Parks case illustrates, to a pattern 
of discriminating practices against African-Americans that were some-
times backed-up by laws, sometimes enacted despite laws to the contrary, 
and in the end denied them real citizenship (cf. Arendt 1969). The appeal 
of the civilly disobedient, although it may be part of a struggle for adjust-
ing laws, addresses the attitudes of people from dominant social groups 
against the dominated, and the social practices that result from it. These 
practices include violence, but also ordinary injustices that evade regula-
tion by law. As the dominated see themselves forced to take recourse to 
civil disobedience, this may show that their problem lies even deeper. The 
difficulties in making a public appeal for social justice are themselves part 
of the social injustices which the dominated suffer. Their appeals remain, 
somehow, invisible to the dominant public. The notion of the public fo-
rum, however, does not allow Rawls to theorise this problem.  
 
Another notion of publicity is needed to make sense of this problem. A 
clue for an alternative understanding is provided by Fricker who draws 
attention to what she calls ‘hermeneutical injustice’: ‘the injustice of hav-
ing some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collec-
tive understanding’ (Fricker 2007: 155). She illustrates this by telling the 
story of Wendy Sanford who, in the late sixties, was battling depression 
after having given birth to a son. One day she visited a university work-
shop on women’s and sexual issues and participated in one of the discus-
sion groups: ‘In my group people started talking about postpartum de-
pression. In that forty-five-minute period I realized that what I’d been 
blaming myself for, and what my husband had blamed me for, wasn’t my 
personal deficiency. It was a combination of psychological things and a 
real societal thing, isolation’ (Susan Brownmiller as quoted by Fricker 
2007: 149). While Fricker is interested in tracing the moral causes of this 
injustice to 'a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical 
resource' (ibid.: 155), as she phrases it in her technical vocabulary, for the 
present argument Fricker may be understood to claim that people should 
be able to articulate, disclose, explicate their social experiences. From this 
we may derive a normative ideal of publicity that is not one of the public 
forum, but one of hermeneutical publicity. 
Fricker is not explicit on the theoretical sources of her notion of ‘herme-
neutical injustice’ or how she understands hermeneutics in this context. 
Here I will turn to Gadamer’s ideas on hermeneutics, including those on 
conversation, which interest me not because of the moral ideal they im-
ply, but because they allow me to distinguish two forms of hermeneutical 
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publicity by tracing what is hermeneutically invisible. Hermeneutics 
should be understood here as a special form of interpretation, one that 
pre-understands other people as intentional subjects, not as objects. Her-
meneutical publicity (or: visibility), however, is not the standard situation. 
Hermeneutic invisibility is part of our human condition in two different 
ways. First, interpretation takes place against a background (‘Hinter-
grund’) of pre-understandings or what Gadamer calls ‘sensus communis’ 
(common sense) (Gadamer 1990). We may call this ‘background invisi-
bility’. Hermeneutic reflection presupposes that something from the 
background understanding becomes visible in reflected, articulated self-
understanding (Gadamer 1993).  
 
Yet another form of hermeneutic invisibility can be distilled from Gada-
mer’s ideas on conversation. In a true conversation people come to an 
understanding. It requires a certain identification, which does not imply a 
transposing of one’s self into another person, but which is a process in 
which ‘each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of 
view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that 
he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to 
be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at 
one with each other on the subject’ (Gadamer 1975: 387). If during a dia-
logue people succeed in mutual identification, the exchange of opinions 
will have a transformative effect on them, changing their previous under-
standings. If a person’s identification fails, however, then the opinion of 
the other will remain hermeneutically invisible to us. This we may call 
‘dialogical invisibility’. 
 
The two criteria of publicity that Rawls distinguishes, ‘addressing public 
principles’ and ‘entering the public forum’, are not enough to make civil 
disobedience into a public act. Only if these notions are supplemented by 
the notion of hermeneutical publicity (or: visibility) can we see that in the 
public sphere normal appeals and civil disobedience may both suffer from 
hermeneutical invisibility. As interesting as this insight may be to moral 
and political theorists, it is crucial, as the Rosa Parks case illustrates, to the 
dominated themselves who wish to be heard. They may use this insight 
for searching those instruments of protest that will overcome herme-
neutical invisibility and make their appeal effective. But this requires 
understanding hermeneutical invisibility as the consequence of a dis-
torted public sphere. This issue I will address in the next section. 
 
 
3. The distorted public sphere: social habits of interpretation 
In the previous section we have seen two forms of hermeneutic invisi-
bility. The idea of a distortion of communicative exchanges within society 
has been explored in different ways by deliberative theorists (see Hayward 
2004). One of the first was Habermas (1970). His ideas have been re-
examined by Warnke (1993), O’Neill (1997) and, also using Bourdieu, Cros-
sley (2004). According to one line of argument the dominant devalue 
what the dominated say on account of their cultural styles of communi-
cation (their way of speaking with an accent, dressing, moving, et cetera). 
To support this claim Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, and specifically of lin-
guistic habitus or habitus in taste, has sometimes been invoked. The gen-
eral idea behind this is that a certain form or style of how people present 
themselves elicits a certain response from others, one which discloses a 
certain evaluation of that style. In the way people present themselves they 
are recognised as part of some particular social group. Depending on how 
this social group is valued, people may be perceived as authoritative spea-
kers or devalued as speakers. Fricker, for example, theorises this as 
‘testimonial injustice’ (2007). I choose a different line of argument. I be-
lieve Bourdieu’s notions allow for yet another interpretation of distorted 
communication, more specific of a distorted public sphere that has not 
yet received much attention from political theorists. If we home in on 
linguistic expressions, Bourdieu’s theoretical frame allows a distinction 
between their form (their style, their non-propositional aspects) and their 
(cognitive) content. Whereas the former line of argument focuses on the 
form of communication and self-presentations and its implications for the 
status of those who speak, regardless of the content, I propose a reading of 
Bourdieu that focuses on the propositional contents of communicative 
exchanges and the extent to which the contents of linguistic expressions 
are caught by habitus. 
 
Bourdieu would agree with Rawls in imagining the public sphere as a fo-
rum where citizens exchange opinions, or a ‘field of opinion’, as Bourdieu 
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Bourdieu phrases it himself (1977: 168). The contents of these opinions, as 
I interpret Bourdieu, are structured in two different ways: according to 
the logic of argument (discourse), and according to social habits of inter-
pretation. The habitus is a system of ‘internalized structures, schemes of 
perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same 
group or class’ (ibid.: 86) which determines people’s attitudes, not only in 
how they act and react towards people from other (dominant or domi-
nated) social groups, but also in how they perceive and understand their 
social world. Bourdieu understands habitus as a response by people to the 
objective conditions of existence (economic, social, et cetera) that build up 
the social world in which people grow up. As past experiences condition 
people to respond in particular ways to these conditions, they tend to per-
form the same reactions whenever similar conditions occur. When condi-
tions change over time but without compelling them to adapt their hab-
ituated responses, people may persist in the same reactions. Although 
people’s habitus, as a structural, internalised response to objective condi-
tions, lends objective social meaning to their practices, this does not mean 
that people perform these practices with the intention of realising this 
objective social meaning. As such the habitus is ‘the source of [a] series of 
moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being the 
product of a genuine strategic intention’ (ibid.: 73). With his notions of 
‘linguistic habitus’ and ‘distinction’ Bourdieu has explored his notion of 
habitus in more specific domains, those of language and taste. Whereas 
these notions stress the non-propositional features of social practices and 
our non-propositional responses to objective conditions, habitus may also 
be applied to the propositional contents of our social practices, i.e. of our 
speech acts. Whenever opinions, as interpretations of objective conditions, 
are expressed according to certain patterns which themselves are not the 
product of a strategic intention, they are what I call social habits of inter-
pretation. 
Interpretive habits raise problems for making normal moral appeals as 
Rawls understands them: they prevent the dominant from seeing alterna-
tive interpretations of social events and, even more so, they prevent the 
dominated from adequately reflecting on social injustice. Although 
Bourdieu has not engaged in discussions on specifically civil disobedience, 
he has always been concerned with social injustice. One way of incorpo-
rating this in his theoretical frame was by introducing the notion of sym-
bolic violence. Whenever habitus, including interpretive habits, function 
to conceal power relations, this is what Bourdieu calls symbolic power. 
One way of understanding this concealment is censorship in its classic 
sense: the dominant who choose to suppress certain expressions. But 
Bourdieu has in mind a more pervasive kind of concealment. Outside the 
field of opinion, the universe of the discussed, is the universe of the undis-
cussed. This is what Bourdieu calls ‘doxa’, which is related to Gadamer’s 
common sense: ‘It seems, however, to be almost a relationship of mir-
rored opposition: while Gadamer emphasizes the enabling aspects of the 
sensus communis, Bourdieu emphasizes its limits’ (Holton 1997: 47). Both 
notions have in common the idea that a great deal of what people do car-
ries implicit, non-deliberative meanings that they take for granted and 
that are beyond their conscious and reflexive grasp. Doxa is therefore pre-
reflective. Whenever there is a ‘quasi-perfect correspondence between the 
objective order and the subjective principles of organization [...] the natu-
ral and social world appears as self-evident’ (Bourdieu 1977: 164). Bourdieu 
is aware, more than is Gadamer, of the implications of doxa for issues of 
power and social justice. Domination will be most effective if censorship is 
internalised and everyone, the dominant and the dominated, accept the 
social order as a natural order. Social injustices lie hidden in the daily 
social practices that people perform with their habitus. As the habitus, 
which governs the interpretive habits, belongs itself to the doxa, people 
take these interpretations as representing the social reality, even if 
counter-evidence is available. Unjust practices therefore appear to them as 
normal and natural. Normal appeals will fail to convince the dominant 
social groups to adopt new interpretations. Bourdieu is even more pessi-
mistic. He questions people’s capacity for self-reflective understanding of 
their social practices and therefore of the mechanisms of power. Although 
the public sphere, the field of opinion, is also a sphere of reflection, the 
social imagination is only quasi-reflective. The limits to self-reflection 
therefore put a limit on the effectiveness of public dialogue. 
Bourdieu allows no room for a disruption of the interpretive habits, of the 
‘undiscussed’, except when a crisis occurs: ‘The critique which brings the 
undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as 
the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the im-
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mediate fit between the subjective structures and objective structures, 
destroys self-evidence practically’ (ibid.: 168-169). The objective crisis en-
ables people to challenge the boundary between doxa and the field of opi-
nion. They make explicit the views on certain social conditions, views that 
until then remained undiscussed and for that reason were invisible, and 
start to question the self-evidence of these views which by now are unvei-
led as arbitrary interpretations. As a result they will bring forward opini-
ons which are heterodox, because they bring undiscussed topics from the 
doxa into the field of opinion. But the crisis is not yet a sufficient conditi-
on for the emergence of a critical discourse. People from dominant social 
groups have an interest in preserving the boundary of doxa even though, 
as this interest too belongs to the universe of doxa, they may not be aware 
of this interest. One possible strategy would be to prevent, by ignoring or 
disqualifying, the need to face, and respond to, the heterodox opinions as 
regards their contents. Another strategy, which is of interest for my ar-
gument, to which their social habits of interpretation will prompt them, 
will be to respond to the contents of the heterodox opinions in an effort 
to force them into the logic of their standard, orthodox interpretations. 
The effect will be that heterodox opinions, in a hermeneutic sense, are 
silenced. A critical discourse which will enable a rationalisation of compe-
ting opinions will be possible only, according to Bourdieu, when ‘the do-
minated have the material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition 
of the real that is imposed on them through logical structures 
reproducing the social structures [...] and to lift the (institutionalized or 
internalized) censorships which it implies’ (ibid.: 169). 
 
When we do not see social habits of interpretation preventing herme-
neutical visibility, we risk not recognising certain acts as civil disobedience. 
This means examples of those who did not succeed, or have not yet suc-
ceeded in making their appeal public, are hard to find, especially so when 
we focus on our own contemporary societies. This is illustrated by the 
situation of minority groups such as the Roma. They live throughout the 
European Union and share the same experiences of institutional discrimi-
nation and social exclusion. Although their situation has been recognised 
by both national authorities and the European Union, their (illegal) acts 
of resistance against political authorities are rarely reported in terms of 
civil disobedience. One reason for this may be that we tend to assume that 
civil disobedience, as the term already suggests, is performed by citizens, 
whereas citizenship is precisely what is often denied to Roma. What the 
problematic status of their citizenship implies for the effectiveness of their 
appeals in the public sphere is illustrated by the campaign of a group of 
Roma NGOs. In the summer of 2010 French authorities started to repatri-
ate thousands of Roma to Romania and Bulgaria in order to get rid of il-
legal camps. Roma NGOs tried to change public perception with a cam-
paign that had as its motto ‘ROMA=CITIZENS’. However, this failed to 
stop or slow down the expulsion of Roma, in part because the motto itself 
was a strategy that could not disrupt the social habits of interpretation 
surrounding the concept of citizenship (cf. Parker 2012). 
 
4. Disrupting the social habits of interpretation 
In the previous two sections I have sketched the problem the dominated 
face in making an appeal. The concept of hermeneutical invisibility makes 
it clear that the social injustice dominated people experience includes the 
problem of making public their claim of social injustice. Next, the notion 
of social habits of interpretation introduces the possibility of a distorted 
public sphere that prevents normal appeals from becoming hermeneuti-
cally public. We have no reason yet to believe that civil disobedience does 
not suffer from this problem. In this section, however, I will show why 
civil disobedience may nevertheless succeed where normal appeals fail. 
First I will argue that the pre-condition for disrupting the social imagina-
tions depends on a pre-reflective capacity to sense injustice that both the 
dominated and the dominant have, despite their interpretive habits. 
 
The claim, implicit in Bourdieu’s notion of ‘doxa’, of how oppressed peo-
ple experience unjust conditions in times without crisis, is problematic (cf. 
Lewandowski 2000; Crossley 2003; Myles 2004). In any society there is an 
imperfect fit between the objective and subjective structures, between 
doxa and the field of opinion, between the actual social practices and what 
they mean according to society’s interpretive habits. In times without cri-
sis, as we have seen, marginalised people experience the imperfect fit, in-
cluding their unjust conditions, as normal and natural because its real 
Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                        Blaakman – Civil Disobedience in a Distorted Public Sphere 
33 
nature is concealed by the social habits of interpretation and other habi-
tus. Bourdieu claims that only an objective crisis enables them to reflect 
on their conditions and realise a more appropriate self-understanding. 
But the reflection of dominated people, however imperfect it may be to 
bring out clear articulated opinions, presupposes also, apart from objec-
tive conditions, subjective experiences that already contain a spark of dis-
content with these conditions. For this claim we find a clue, again, in Fric-
ker’s idea of hermeneutical injustice. Wendy Sanford, in the example we 
mentioned earlier, had a sense that she was unhappy with her condition 
even though she lacked the appropriate words and the context for under-
standing it. Furthermore, when she met other women in a similar situati-
on, she was able, not only to recognise what other people said as relevant 
to her own situation, but to incorporate what was said into feelings she 
already had. The notion of doxa cannot, however, allow an understan-
ding of people’s doxa as including discontent. By stressing the normality 
that oppressed people experience in relation to their oppressive 
conditions, Bourdieu assumes that doxa, in times without crises, is har-
monious in a way that suggests that people experience some kind of con-
tentment with their social situation. But a harmonious experience would 
provide no interesting material for self-reflection.  
 
Another construction is needed of people’s subjective experiences to the 
extent that they belong, beyond reflected self-understandings, beyond 
habitual interpretations, to the universe of doxa. This requires a different 
view on ‘doxa’. At the same time the challenge is to preserve those ele-
ments of ‘doxa’ that support the analysis of a distorted public sphere. 
Doxa can be understood as the universe of the undiscussed, but also as the 
attitude itself that people in society have incorporated towards the uni-
verse of the undiscussed: the habitus, the ‘feel for the game’ or, as 
Bourdieu also phrases it, the practical sense. It means that people act in 
silent recognition of what remains as undiscussed. I argue for a broader 
notion of sense than Bourdieu uses (‘sens pratique’), one that includes the 
sense of injustice (cf. Ostrow 1990; Shklar 1990). Whereas the practical 
sense generates a sensitivity for the unspoken rules of the game that are 
implied in social practices, the sense of injustice, on the other hand, cre-
ates a sensitivity for the dissonance between what the rules of the game 
require, and their habitual interpretations. Experiencing the social order 
as natural and normal is not necessarily the same as having a harmonious 
experience and does not preclude the simultaneous experience of discon-
tent. Even when the injustices people suffer are hermeneutically invisible 
to themselves and go unrecognised as an experience of social injustice, 
this does not imply that people are blind to the disadvantageous, hard 
social conditions they personally suffer from. People do sense, at least 
within the limits of their personal experiences, the differences between 
their unfavourable situation and those of dominant social groups. And 
they do sense the burden of their own situation in comparison with the 
situation of the dominant. To the extent that they are sensitive, therefore, 
to the dissonance between the habitus that prompts them and others to 
respond in certain ways, and the needs, wishes, or dreams they have in 
whatever rudimentary form, they may come to experience discontent 
about their conditions. At this stage it does not matter that they are yet 
incapable of articulating their discontent as an indignation about social 
injustice.  
 
The sense of injustice forms the pre-condition for emancipation and po-
litical resistance. It allows for acts of civil disobedience even when people 
have not yet completed the transition from background invisibility to self-
reflection. If injustices are invisible to people from both dominant and 
dominated social groups, it would seem that political resistance, including 
civil disobedience, is not possible as it presupposes awareness of those in-
justices. This is not the case. Even if people are not in a situation of articu-
lating this discontent as one of social injustice, they may nevertheless act 
on their discontent (see Scott 1990). As people have a sense of injustice, 
they also have a pre-understanding of the limits of the social power they 
are subjected to. In such cases it is crucial that the act of breaking the law 
remains non-public. Only in a later phase, when people of a dominated 
social group have organised themselves, may the process of self-reflection 
evolve to the point where they choose to make their appeal public. 
 
All moral appeals in the public sphere have in common the attempt to 
question habitual interpretations of certain social practices. Moral appeals 
therefore start from the hope for dialogue and intend to persuade the 
dominant public opinion by articulating what is claimed to be a social in-
justice. Just as dominated people have a practical sense and a sense of soci-
Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                        Blaakman – Civil Disobedience in a Distorted Public Sphere 
34 
social injustice, so have the dominant. While the first sense determines 
whether the dominant register social injustice, the second sense deter-
mines how they are affected by them. The problem is precisely that their 
sense of social injustice tends be weak to the extent that habitus, and 
social habits of interpretation in particular, confirms their dominant posi-
tion. Whatever reasonable and well-articulated appeal is made, its re-
sponses remain caught in the patterns of interpretive habits. This obtains 
for both normal appeals and civil disobedience. What is needed is some-
thing that somehow arouses dominant people’s sense of social injustice. 
 
Civil disobedience is more than a purely moral appeal. It can be effective 
where normal appeals cannot, because the civilly disobedient have realised 
that their earlier normal appeal failed due to its hermeneutical invisibility. 
They use this insight to find means of protest that pass the test of mo-
rality, but may also disrupt the social habits of interpretation. The secret 
to their success is that they persist, as they did when they made a normal 
appeal, in addressing the dominant public as a moral public, but they em-
ploy resources of dialogue that differ from those used in making their 
normal appeal. The use of the ‘dialogue’ metaphor in relation to the pub-
lic sphere should not blind us to differences in dialogue between people in 
a face-to-face setting and interactions between social groups in the public 
sphere. But there are certain analogies that work for both. Gadamer 
teaches that the exchange of opinions has a deliberative impact on people: 
a true conversation changes our own understandings. If, however, we 
limit our understanding of dialogue to an exchange of opinions as propo-
sitional contents, we are in danger of blinding ourselves to the dialogical 
force of the non-verbal, the non-propositional, implicit meanings of our 
practices. From Bourdieu we may learn, especially from the way he shows, 
more so than Gadamer, that doxa is always present in what we do, includ-
ing the dialogues we ‘do’. When one person talks to another it has a delib-
erative impact on the other by what she says, but a non-deliberative im-
pact by how she says it, how she behaves while saying it. (Although this 
idea is implicit in Bourdieu, he has not, as far as I know, explicitly dealt 
with analysing this. cf. Goffman 1981; Garfinkel 1964; Heritage and Clay-
man 2010.) But an impact which is non-deliberative may nevertheless ha-
ve a dialogical effect, encouraging or inviting the other to an attitude of 
identification. This type of effect is related to what Warren called ‘the illo-
cutionary force of good manners’ (2006). If, in a conversation, someone 
feels she is not being heard, she still has strategies available that may help 
her to win the attention of the other, sometimes even by disrupting the 
habitual ‘logic’ for having a conversation, for example by being silent (cf. 
Brown 1998) or by performing rituals of mourning (Pool 2012). Therefore 
dialogue is an exchange of acts that have both a deliberative and a non-
deliberative impact. A dialogue in a face-to-face-setting may have its equi-
valence in the public sphere. When, in the case of normal appeals, discon-
tented citizens focus solely on what they have to say, they are in danger of 
not being heard, as we have seen in the previous sections. They should, 
therefore, also speak by performing acts that have a non-deliberative yet 
dialogical impact. This impact appeals at first to the practical sense of peo-
ple from dominant social groups. It should enable them to identify and 
sympathise with discontented citizens (although they need not be aware 
of the non-deliberative impact). Next, discontened citizens may succeed 
to arouse the sense of social injustice the dominant have. And this, finally, 
may disrupt their habits of interpretation. 
 
It seems that breaking the law is a powerful act of creating a non-
deliberative impact and thereby forces a crisis in the habitual interpreta-
tions, precisely because in a (near) just society the rule of law is considered 
to be fundamental to realising justice. If people choose to break a law for 
their cause, risking punishment, it must be something very important to 
them. It is therefore tempting to consider, as Rawls does and with him 
many others, acts of political resistance, based on breaking the law, as con-
stituting a different class of political resistance: civil disobedience. Here I 
disagree with Rawls. A definition of civil disobedience as breaking the law 
is a definition from the perspective of the dominant. Many breaches of law 
of which African-Americans were victim, were not recognised as such. On 
the other hand, both Claudette Colvin and Rosa Parks, for example, were 
probably not breaking the law in a technical sense, but only subverting 
custom (McGuire 2010). What matters for the civilly disobedient is not 
breaking the law, but what the dominant public perceives as breaking the 
law. Even then, breaking a law, or at least what the dominant public per-
ceives as such, is in the first place a means of generating publicity, of get-
ting access to the public sphere of the dominant. What really matters for 
the civilly disobedient is to find what will set in motion the sympathetic 
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identification of the dominant public: what law to break, how to do this, 
what other actions are required. What creates the non-deliberative impact 
the civilly disobedient need, is not that they break the law, but how they 
break the law. Consider, for example, the demonstration that the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and its leader Martin Luther 
King organised in 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama. The aim was that the 
demonstrators would protest non-violently for several days. But the 
choice for Birmingham was strategic. Its Commissioner of Public Safety 
was ‘a notorious racist and redhead who could be depended on not to re-
spond non-violently’ (Howard Hubbard as quoted by McAdam, Doug 
2011). The violent response against the demonstrators created the non-
deliberative impact the demonstrators had wanted. Public opinion was on 
their side. Finally, I believe that appeals for social justice may be effective 
by employing non-deliberative resources, even without the need for 
breaking the law. My suggestion, therefore, is that in our analysis of non-
violent acts of political resistance, including civil disobedience, we focus 
less on breaking the law as a criterion of distinction, and more on the dia-
logical effectiveness of non-violent political resistance. 
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